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Abstract 
 
Somalia’s Federal Government (SFG) tries to 
assert a ‘monopoly of coercion’ in the country 
that is contested. Sovereignty is de facto 
shared with other internal actors as well as 
Somalia’s neighbours that are actively 
engaged. Moreover, a number of domestic 
actors contest the state’s monopoly of power. 
These actors have their own institutions that 
compete with the state institutions that 
challenge the latter’s governance efforts as 
well. The SFG came into being when the 
majority of the Federal Member States (FMS) 
were already well established and functioning 
beyond Mogadishu’s control. This implies 
that the processes of incorporating the 
Federal Member States back into the SFG 
fold will necessitate a concerted effort of 
elite bargaining and may well be an uphill 
struggle if the methodology is force. The 
SFG’s feeble legitimacy, as well as the 
existence of competing economic and 
political structures and its inability to obtain 
buy-in the capital’s constituencies makes the 
effort to exercise monopoly of violence even 
more challenging. The FMS appear to be 
inexorably attached to their constituencies 
and there is obviously complementarity in 
FMS governance and clan rules. Clan identity 
and a majoritarian arrangement play the 
biggest role. This in turn explains why FMS 
exercise coercive capacities of violence in 
areas that the central government has little or 
no control over. Non-state actors such as al-
Shabaab also exercise power in areas they 
control directly, and virtually in areas where 
others, including the SFG, claim to have 
territorial control.  
 
This redistributed monopoly of violence 
places the issue of security and the security 
sector in Somalia under greater scrutiny. The 
question therefore is whether one can claim 
to have a security sector while the 
international community is involved in 
reforming that sector at the centre in 
Somalia. This paper tries to explain the 
inconsistencies that arise from using the 
security sector concept and sets out the 
problems of reforming it in states such as 
Somalia where all the assumptions that a 
security sector is conceived on do not apply. 
Moreover, the government’s monopoly of 
violence is contested through informal rules 
and the violence that other non-state actors 
exercise, whereby constituencies cooperate 
willingly or unwillingly, and with a 
peacekeeping framework where the UN 
claims that there is ‘no peace to keep.’ 
Hence, the existence of that monopoly of 
coercion or the likelihood of one emerging 
seems a distant possibility. All of this would 
require another explanation and advance a 
different framework—the security arena that 
provides an objective assessment of 
Somalia’s current status—that could better 
explain the existing reality in the country and 
the futile exercise of security sector reform 
that is consuming huge resources from 
Somalia itself and from elsewhere.  
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Introduction  
 
State security—peace and security of the 
people and the country—continue to be the 
raison d’être for states, which always have a 
security policy in their engagements.1 These 
engagements are sometimes conducted with 
states whose sovereignty is damaged and 
whose capacity to exercise state functions in 
the territories they claim to represent is 
contested. States also deal with non-state 
actors for similar reasons. In this case 
international rules do not provide mechanisms 
to allow states neighbouring weak states to 
engage non-state actors—neither in 
cooperation nor contestation—who control 
areas adjacent to their borders in order to fend 
off real or perceived threats. What is more 
interesting is the way the international 
community tries to handle the security sectors 
of those failed states and engage them without 
considering the policies and concerns of 
countries in the neighbourhood, including 
those who are involved in peacekeeping and 
stabilization.  
 
Moreover, there is in fact a pretence that there 
is a security sector in the failed or weak state in 
question—Somalia—and that its reform will 
help in the creation of sustainable peace and 
stability, as well as in bringing about good 
governance through the full implementation of 
the rule of law. Within the context of the 
security sector there is a need for 
management of a multiplicity of actors, 
demobilization and integration of militias, 
establishment of the rule of law and 
construction of a security governance system 
that protects the society from threats.2 But 
none of these are goals are achievable in 
 
1 Mesfin and Beyene: “The Practicalities of Living with Failed 
States,” Daedalus, 146, 4 (Winter 2018), 128-140. 
Somalia currently. Moreover, the main 
assumptions in the security sector reform 
paradigm are the existence of an agreement 
between belligerent parties that the 
international community supports, and a 
process that will lead to the state’s monopoly 
of coercion or reforms that lead to the state’s 
all-but guaranteed monopoly of coercion. Given 
the current circumstances of the country, 
achieving this in Somalia is a Sisyphean task. 
In Somalia one observes that capacity has 
been redistributed and there are multiple 
actors, including AMISOM—a peace 
enforcement military engagement with a 
similar mandate to the UN’s failed attempt in 
Somalia in the early 1990s—although the 
actors that AMISOM engages are completely 
different.  
 
A number of actors and institutions challenge 
the state’s monopoly of coercion in Somalia. 
The first reality is the existence of a number of 
administrations that exercise their respective 
powers to maintain relative peace and stability; 
these are known as the Federal Member States 
(FMS). The second is related to the existence 
of informal institutions that govern the 
behaviour of individuals involved in the 
maintenance of peace and security for the SFG 
and various non-state actors. These rules 
sometimes defy the state in exercising the 
monopoly of coercion. Incorporating them 
therefore will help to legitimize the process.3 
But mechanisms to incorporate these informal 
institutions have yet to be created for 
Somalia’s governance structures on a national 
scale. A third reality is the existence of third-
party actors that share the state’s monopoly of 
coercion. In this connection, the SFG has 
accepted the sub-contracting of the monopoly 
2 Paul Jackson in Schnabel and Farr (eds.) 2012: Back to the 
Roots: Security Sector Reform and Development, Geneva Center 
for Democratic Control of Armed Forces. 
3 Ibid. 
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of coercion to AMISOM’s forces and Somalia’s 
neighbours, who are exercising coercion in the 
border areas as members of the peacekeeping 
force. But these countries also exercise 
coercion directly or through proxies in their 
respective buffer zones.4 Furthermore, the 
existence of non-state actors that coerce 
constituencies, such as terrorist groups 
including al-Shabaab and the Islamic State in 
Somalia (ISS) that use parts of Somalia’s 
ungoverned spaces and even exercise coercion 
in areas under the control of state actors in 
order to have a virtual impact, is another 
aspect that affects the SFG’s monopoly of 
coercion. These three realities explain how the 
effort of reforming Somalia’s security sector 
would be challenging, and nearly impossible. 
The interaction of these three factors and their 
individual roles in explaining how far one can 
go in transforming the ‘security sector,’ 
indicates the need to look at realities and 
reinforce or change the realities in order to 
move forward. 
 
Therefore, the questions that follow are these: 
How does the relationship between the SFG 
and the FMS affect the state’s monopoly of 
coercion? Given the fact that militias act on the 
basis of their clan’s perceived and/or real 
interests, how does this impact the ability of 
the security institutions to provide security? 
Can we talk of security sector reform for a 
country with a fragmented clan system, whose 
government is not enjoying the monopoly of 
coercion and there is no process or a clear 
insight that frames a possibility for a monopoly 
of coercion? Given the complex realities of 
Somalia, can we properly consider the existing 
security sector and its eventual reform 
representative of all the stakeholders or is it a 
farce? If so, what can provide a better 
framework to explain the realities of Somalia 
 
4 Mesfin and Beyene: “The Practicalities of Living with Failed 
States”, Daedalus, 146, 4 (Winter 2018), 128-140. 
and the existing diversity of the actors and the 
interface between formal and informal 
institutions that govern the behaviour of 
individuals, groups, state and non-state actors 
at local and federal levels? Should we invest in 
reforming the ‘security sector’ in Somalia at all? 
Is the international community doing the right 
thing in its engagement in the name of 
reforming the security sector with everyone’s 
consent? What is the alternative? What works 
and what don’t in Somalia? 
 
On the other hand, Somalia’s peace support 
mission’s actors are more organized than any 
of the Somali actors in the security arena. 
Hence, the application of security sector 
reform is a political pretext, a supply driven 
from donors that Somalis use to collect rents 
and financial benefits and its treatment in 
Somalia is quite disjointed. Security sector is 
driven because there is a supply that Somalis 
interact with as an opportunity to be milked.  
Looking at the parameters for sending 
peacekeeping forces, which vary from place to 
place depending on the urgency and gravity of 
the situation and perhaps more importantly, 
the interests of great powers, investigation of 
this aspect in the Somalia context is critical. In 
the short history of peacekeeping, countries 
like Somalia have certainly been treated 
indifferently. Somalia was an arena that a 
peace enforcement mission was tried and 
failed for the first time in the 1990s. Indeed, the 
UN continues, even today, to claim that there is 
‘no peace to keep’ there. But if there is no 
peace to keep, why deploy a continental force 
and mandate it? In fact the African Union 
Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) is there with a 
mandate to protect SFG institutions, although 
it is also engaged in an enforcement mission, 
combatting extremist groups as well as 
assisting Somalis and the federal government 
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in Mogadishu in building capacities. It is 
paradoxical that the AU mission deployed in 
Somalia has this mandate through the UN 
Security Council (UNSC), while the UN itself 
says there is no peace to keep in Somalia.  
 
Clearly, the UN could have said that the UN 
Charter does not give the Security Council the 
mandate to deploy a combat force. However, 
appreciating Africa’s recognition of the danger 
groups such as al-Shabaab create for Somalia 
and the region as well as the international 
community, the UNSC fully supported the 
African initiative to send a combat force, 
providing resources and the mandate through 
subsidiarity.5 
 
Unfortunately, there is a clear lack of interest in 
what is going on in Somalia among the major 
powers in the Security Council and the UN 
bureaucracy. They continuously discouraged 
the deployment of the UN peacekeeping force 
in Somalia. Somalia’s neighbours, who are 
capable and prepared to fight al-Shabaab, if 
engaged constructively could create a reality in 
Somalia that would allow the international 
community to engage in Somalia differently. 
The UN continues to pretend that  ‘there is no 
peace to keep’ in Somalia, while creating a half-
hearted mechanism for continental or regional 
actors to tender bids, creating a preferable 
alternative both in terms of costs and 
sacrifices to sending a UN peacekeeping force 
to Somalia. It is within this context that one 
should inquire into the aspects of security 
sector reform that partners embark on in 
Somalia. 
 
 
5 There is a need for reference here on subsidiarity. 
6 IGAD was established as an intergovernmental authority for 
drought and desertification (IGADD) in 1986, but revitalized in 
1996 to incorporate three priority areas of peace and security, 
food security and environmental protection and the 
development of infrastructure in the region. It was renamed the 
Intergovernmental Authority on Development in 1996 as part of 
that revitalization. 
That is why it is critical to investigate the 
existence of competing powers in Somalia—
between the centre and the periphery and their 
respective relations—the presence of informal 
institutions that undermine the monopoly of 
coercion in areas that the SFG controls, the 
presence and mandate of AMISOM with little 
consideration of the neighbourhood, and the 
existence of a sustained but very much divided 
monopoly of violence. This will help one to 
understand how Somalia’s security sector and 
its possible reform remain a futile exercise. 
Moreover, looking at the changing realities and 
the security complexes of the Horn of Africa 
will help in further explicating the challenges 
Somalia faces in its overall state-building 
effort. 
 
Somalia and the regional context 
 
The Horn of Africa is the most challenging and 
conflict-ridden region of Africa (Menkhaus 
2010, Redai, Reno, Prunier). Conflicts in the 
Horn of Africa region have created two new 
states, Eritrea and the Republic of South 
Sudan, since the end of the Cold War and after 
three and four decades of devastating civil 
wars respectively. The region has been 
ravaged by Cold War rivalries and proxy wars. 
It also hosts failed states with security 
implications for the region and beyond, 
including the possibility of new breakaway 
states. There are a number of reasons for the 
troubles in the Horn. The fundamental problem 
of peace and security within the 
Intergovernmental Authority for Development 
(IGAD)6 region is due to the lack of respect 
some states7 have for the basic principles 
7 The IGAD countries of the Horn of Africa include Djibouti, 
Eritrea (withdrawn from its membership because of the war 
between Ethiopia and Eritrea and Eritrea’s subsequent 
accusations of the organization being a stooge for Ethiopia’s 
foreign policies, it has however now been readmitted in 
September 2018), Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, South Sudan, the 
Sudan and Uganda. 
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governing interstate relations, their dismissal 
of international law or even the rule of law in 
general, as well as lack of any concept of a 
democratic culture of peace or of mutual 
respect.8 Some of the region’s governments 
have made no effort to obey the basic principle 
of non-interference in the internal affairs of 
other countries. Equally, the lack of 
development, abject poverty, state failure, weak 
institutions and structures of governance, 
environmental degradation, drought and other 
calamities have significantly contributed to 
problems in the Horn. IGAD member states 
certainly recognize these facts, and the 
organization has formulated a Peace and 
Security Strategy, endorsed by its policy 
organs, to address these problems.9 The 
predatory nature of the states and their hostile 
relations, the proxy wars that the region has 
continued to play host to, big power politics 
and regional rivalries and the effects of Gulf 
crisis spill-over into the Horn all in tandem 
complicate Somalia’s effort to achieve stability 
and a sustainable peace as well as to build a 
government that is acceptable to the major 
actors within the country and beyond. 
 
The region was the site of major Cold War 
activity in the 1970s and 80s and continues to 
endure ongoing but substantial interventions 
by outside rival powers that are competing in 
the emerging multi-polar world. Other factors 
such as the region’s proximity to the Middle 
East and the exportable nature of the Gulf 
crisis and its repercussions in the Horn, and 
the fact that the region is the source of the Nile 
waters, which remains a security issue for 
lower riparian states such as Egypt, make the 
politics in the Horn of Africa unpredictable and 
fickle. Egypt has played a role in the Ethiopia-
 
8 The IGAD Peace and Security Strategy include a number of 
factors for the regions’ problems. 
9 The practical implementation of the peace and security 
strategy has yet to be seen. 
10 CDRC Digest (2017). 
Eritrea conflict, both during the independence 
struggle of Eritrea in the 1960s-80s and the 
border conflict between Ethiopia and Eritrea 
that resulted in the 1998-2000 war.10 Following 
the war, Eritrea’s effort to use Somalia for a 
proxy war against Ethiopia contributed to 
crises at the regional level.  
 
Egypt’s role in Somalia and the region in 
general has been directly connected to what it 
calls a ‘national security matter linked to the 
Nile waters.’11 Whenever Ethiopia and Somalia 
went to war in the 1960s and 70s, Egypt played 
a visible role both in terms of material and 
political support against Ethiopia mobilized 
from the Arab world. Ethiopia’s leaders have 
always been concerned about the asymmetric 
relationship between the Horn and the Gulf 
countries, and they have considered any 
implementation of Egyptian policies in the 
Horn with direct or indirect financing from the 
Gulf a catastrophe.12 
 
Egyptian leaders have successfully created an 
illusion that the Nile waters belong to Arabs 
and hence should be protected from use by the 
upper riparian states at any cost. Hence all 
their regional policy considered this as the 
basis irrespective of their public pledge. When 
the Muslim Brotherhood came to power 
following the Arab Spring protests in Egypt, 
some Egyptian politicians suggested that it 
was necessary to play what they call the 
Ogaden and the Oromia cards, and they also 
suggested possible support for opposition 
groups and seizing opportunities to exploit 
11 Interview with retired foreign ministry official of Ethiopia, June 
2018. 
12 Alex de Waal (2018): The Future of Ethiopia, Developmental 
State or Political Marketplace? World Peace Foundation. 
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‘Ethiopia’s fragility’13 in a live but ‘mistakenly’14 
broadcasted debate. Ethiopia is currently 
building the ‘Great Ethiopian Renaissance 
Dam,’ the second largest dam on the Nile River 
(the Egyptian Aswan Dam is the biggest dam 
on the river), and this adds more concern for 
Egyptians and their politicians. Ethiopia, the 
Sudan and Egypt have yet to clearly stipulate 
and agree on the impact of the dam, which 
means that this issue will continue to feature in 
the foreign policy and security calculations of 
these countries.  
 
The Gulf crisis and its impact on Somalia is 
another issue that needs to be taken into 
consideration in the analysis of the regional 
context. This is critical since the GCC crisis has 
affected Somalia directly. Although Saudi 
Arabia and the United Arab Emirates have 
reconciled Ethiopia and Eritrea and brought 
Djibouti and Somalia into the fold the objective 
is to instrumentalize the situation for their own 
interests rather than create sustainable peace 
and stability in the Horn. The Gulf countries 
have always engaged in a divide-and-rule game 
in this region.15 One cannot convince Somalis 
that the leadership of the SFG deserves the 
treatment it has received elsewhere, while 
unable to forge consensus in the country.16 
Somalia’s political and security developments 
should be viewed in light of these realities and 
the issues contributing to the tremendous 
challenges of state-building and the creation of 
an effective security system in the country 
must be identified. This would also mean that 
 
13 Ethiopia’s building of the Grand Renaissance Dam on the Nile 
River has provoked an intense political debate in Egypt over 
whether Egypt should strike the Dam militarily or not. That 
debate has yet to settle. In the first week of June 2013, senior 
government officials and opposition party leaders held a 
national dialogue in Cairo, ‘mistakenly’ transmitted live on an 
Egyptian TV channel. Some opposition leaders asked for a 
military strike targeting the Dam, or suggested leveraging 
through Ethiopian opposition groups or Ethiopia’s neighbors to 
undermine Ethiopia’s interests, to force the country stop 
building the Dam. The opposition wanted to capitalize on the 
fears of Egyptian citizens to get some political benefits. It is 
the security arena observed in Somalia would 
remain in place for a long time to come. 
1) The existence of autonomous FMS, non-
state actors and international actors 
involved in the security arena 
 
More than 27 years have elapsed since 
Somalia enjoyed a functional government.  
Despite their reputation for homogeneity, 
which may be based on the fact that the 
majority of Somalis share the same language, 
religion, physical features and cultures, 
Somalis have been unable to re-establish their 
united and cohesive state since 1991. Indeed, 
by default, Somalia has divided itself into areas 
of different administrations, creating clan-
based governance structures. This has 
encouraged the creation of a security arena 
where autonomous actors play roles. 
Numerous other internal and external actors in 
Somalia share the security arena as well.  
 
Somalia’s unity and territorial integrity is 
considered sacrosanct as a member of the 
regional organizations of IGAD, the League of 
Arab States (LAS), the Organization of Islamic 
Cooperation (OIC), the AU and the UN. But in 
reality Somalia’s internal configuration is far 
from the conventional single state, as the 
international community recognizes the 
country. Internal administrative set-ups like 
Somaliland, Puntland, Galmudug, Hir-Shebelle, 
Jubaland, the South West administration and 
Al-Shabaab and the Islamic State in Somalia 
(ISIS) share the security arena with the Federal 
possible the Egyptian ruling party might have purposefully aired 
the broadcast live to reveal opposition weaknesses, but the 
broadcast created panic in the Egyptian media. More on this 
can be found at www.danielberhaneworldpress.com 
14 Some argued that the live transmission was done 
purposefully to discredit politicians there in the eyes of Ethiopia 
and show that the Muslim Brothers leaders wanted to show 
Ethiopia’s leaders that they are the best interlocutors to deal 
with. Some suggest the situation rather backfired in all aspects. 
15 Interview with senior member of the Hiraal Institute, Addis 
Ababa, September 20, 2018. 
16 Ibid. 
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Government of Somalia, and all exercise their 
various coercive capacities to determine the 
behaviours of the people that they govern, 
directly or virtually. The geography of the 
country and the long coastlines that the 
country has allows these administrations have 
their external interlocutors and conduct a 
foreign policy without the centre’s consent, 
which in turn impacts the security arena in 
different ways. International actors including 
Somalia’s neighbours—Kenya and Ethiopia, in 
particular—acting unilaterally and within the 
context of AMISOM (comprising Uganda, 
Ethiopia, Kenya, Djibouti as well as other 
countries who have contributed to the police 
force and the civilian component, including the 
United States and others)—also act within the 
security arena. All of these have made 
contributions, both in strengthening the state’s 
monopoly of coercion and undermining it. But 
there is a need to assess how these regional 
administrations operate within the country, 
their political visions and what these mean for 
the security arena and its sustainability in 
Somalia.  
a) Somaliland 
 
In the north-western part of the country there is 
Somaliland, a former British protectorate on 26 
June 196017, but joined Mogadishu with the 
intention to recover the lost territory (the 
Haud—the place where Somalis from the 
northwest use for grazing their herds—that 
Somaliland claims to have been unfairly 
handed over to Ethiopia in the 1940s) and unite 
all Somali speaking territories.18 Somaliland is 
a functional state, unilaterally declared its 
independence after endorsing a constitution 
 
17 Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation of 
the Republic of Somaliland published a position paper on 
“Somaliland—An International Case 2016.  
18 Ibid. 
19 Although the contested territories of Sool and Sanaag have 
dented Somaliland’s claim to statehood, as the autonomous 
that claims Somaliland’s independent 
statehood. The state aspires for international 
recognition but yet has to achieve it. A 
functional state that aspires to independence 
and international recognition might have a 
difficulty to prioritize perfect cooperation and 
coordination with Somalia per se. Somaliland 
authorities declared their separation from the 
rest of Somalia in 1991, but thus far they have 
failed to secure international recognition.19 
Moreover, Somaliland’s leaders follow 
developments in Mogadishu very closely, and 
they have engaged Mogadishu in a dialogue, 
which Turkey has facilitated, though there has 
been no progress in either the effort to secure 
independence or in creating a framework for 
their future relationship. Somaliland gives the 
issue priority as it is trying to secure 
concessions from the south.  Mogadishu 
thinks that Somaliland leaders came to the 
negotiating table because they have lost hope 
of obtaining international recognition. These 
different premises do not provide a realistic 
basis for any serious negotiation. It is rather a 
question of two parallel lines, which can never 
meet. Somaliland’s institutions operate 
properly, and the state has control over the 
majority of the territory, although Puntland and 
Khatoumo states challenge Somaliland’s 
control in the eastern part of the country. 
 
One needs also to consider the fact that in 
Somaliland clan rules also operate in a 
complimentary way with formal state 
institutions. The fact that the Somali National 
Movement (SNM) embedded clan leaders as 
the main pillar of the struggle against Siad 
Barre’s regime helped to strengthen the 
complementarity between the formal and 
region cannot be said to exercise complete territorial control 
over this part of its claimed territory, some countries have 
representatives on the ground. Ethiopia and Djibouti have their 
representatives in Hargeisa, Somaliland. Turkey also has a 
consular office. There is increasing engagement from the Gulf 
countries, including Saudi Arabia and the UAE. 
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informal institutions. Current leaders in 
Mogadishu understand the position of 
Somaliland. But they are not ready to recognize 
this. They have been trying to further widen the 
gap between Hargeisa and Garowe, the 
capitals of Somaliland and Puntland 
respectively, to undermine Somaliland. The 
SFG on the other hand has no leverage on 
Somaliland except by way of some of the 
authority that the SFG exercises through 
international institutions such as the 
International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO).  
 
The government in Mogadishu automatically 
claims these international institutions since it 
has taken the Somalia seat everywhere. These 
places are supply driven as all other 
institutions and are not determined internally. 
Security Sector Reform is not different. It is 
driven from elsewhere and Somalia’s 
subsequent governments are just grabbing the 
opportunity. But, Somaliland exercises its 
monopoly of violence in most of the state’s 
territories. Mogadishu’s current government, 
although has collected a couple of politicians 
representing the ‘Dir’ clan (incorporating part of 
the Issa, Issaq, and minority Dir clans) from 
Somaliland, it cannot claim to exercise any 
influence de facto in Somaliland. 
b) Puntland 
 
In 1998 the people of northeast Somalia 
established a fragile but relatively peaceful and 
stable semi-autonomous region called 
‘Puntland State of Somalia.’ Puntland came 
about out of the frustration that actors from 
the region endured during the 1997 Cairo 
meeting of Somali factions. Although the 
meeting failed to produce a consensus-based 
national framework for an all-inclusive 
 
20 As the Head of the Ethiopian Trade Office in Hargeisa, the 
author was involved in engaging the Somaliland leadership to 
de-escalate the situation. Currently the IGAD Special Envoy and 
government, the measures that those in the 
northeast took left a mark on Somalia’s state-
building efforts to establish federalism. 
Puntland’s frontier includes the Harti-Majertain 
enclave and other Harti clans whose territory 
runs through the territories of the Dulbahante 
and Warsangali clans. But these territories are 
shared with Somaliland. From the colonial 
boundary perspective, the administrative 
regions of Sool and Sanaag were part of the 
former British Protectorate of Somaliland, but 
these clans share lineages with the Majerteen 
as part of the Harti clan family and thus they 
are also claimed by Puntland, a lineage with 
informal institutions that always emerges in 
war and peace locally or beyond that 
Somaliland and Puntland have to deal with for 
a long time.  
 
This contestation has led to problems with 
neighbouring Somaliland. Somaliland and 
Puntland have had several confrontations, with 
each reasserting the upper hand in these 
areas. Ethiopia, it should be noted, has 
consistently put all possible pressure on both 
sides to avoid a full-scale war.20 Majerteen 
politicians may have differences regarding how 
Puntland should be managed and 
administered, but all agree that Puntland 
should continue to have a role in the 
Mogadishu-based Somali state, and their 
organization as Puntland state will leverage the 
national level power-sharing arrangement.  
 
This determination will also address the 
challenges in the Lower Juba region, where 
Puntlanders want to see their Harti clan 
compatriots’ rights respected and, indeed, their 
supremacy maintained. Puntland supports the 
current Jubaland administration, even if an 
Ogaden rather than a Harti leads it, as the issue 
the Head of the IGAD Facilitation Office is engaging both 
administrations and the SFG to further enhance dialogue on the 
matter. 
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is within the context of the larger 
Hawiye/Darood rivalry. Previously the 
leadership of the Transitional Federal 
Government (TFG), established in 2004 at the 
Mbagathi conference in Kenya and led by 
Abdillahi Yusuf, vetoed the process of 
establishing a regional administration for Juba. 
But the government’s eventual reorganization 
under the Djibouti Agreement of 2008 created 
a better opportunity for the creation of an 
administration. But this does not mean that 
Mogadishu currently enjoys leverage over 
Puntland. Obviously there is a tacit agreement 
to not allow Somaliland to secede from 
Somalia, but aside from Sool and Sanaag, 
Puntland governs its territory independently. 
c) Jubaland 
 
After October 2012, the AMISOM supported 
SFG reasserted its power through a 
reconciliation and constitution-making process 
held in Mogadishu. Before then the 
government had struggled to establish itself in 
the face of the extremist violence of Al-
Shabaab, but the assistance of AMISOM and 
other allies allowed significant progress in 
expanding government/AMISOM control in 
Mogadishu and other areas, creating a 
situation that would be conducive to a 
successful transition away from the SFG. But 
this situation changed following the 
election/selection of Somali President 
Farmajo. As a Darood sub-clan enclave, 
Puntland fully supported Farmajo’s election. 
President Farmajo visited Puntland in January 
2018. But Farmajo’s visit heightened tensions 
between Puntland and Somaliland.  
 
This has not prevented continuous wrangling 
between clans for control of lower Juba and 
the valuable port of Kismayo, which has 
 
21 Interview with a senior Sahan International official in Nairobi 
June 2018. 
changed hands a number of times until the 
recent establishment of Jubaland state. The 
efforts to establish an administration in 
Kismayo has created a rift between the Darood 
and the Hawiye, the two major contending 
clans in south Somalia, but it also reflects the 
differences between the Somali Federal 
Government (reflecting the Hawiye sentiment) 
and Puntland (reflecting the Darood sentiment) 
before the establishment of the Jubaland State 
with the support of Kenya. Puntland leaders 
have sought to carry out their policies in 
southern Somalia in such a way as to 
safeguard their continuing clan interests in the 
national government, taking into consideration 
the wellbeing of the substantial number of 
Harti that settled in the port and surrounding 
Kismayo.  
 
In the early days of the 1950s and 60s all 
Daroods except the Ogaden were seen as Harti 
politically, but this has changed dramatically 
since Somalia’s civil wars since 1991. However 
the inter-Darood difference on Kismayo has 
instigated a national-level clan rivalry between 
the Hawiye and Darood through the Marehan 
and Habir Gedir, hence forcing the Harti in 
Puntland to support an Ogaden leader for 
Kismayo. That is why the regional 
administration in Kismayo led by a former 
Islamic Courts Union militia leader, Sheikh 
Ahmed Madobe, secured the support of the 
majority of Daroods. All Darood clans (except a 
few Marehan politicians) took a common stand 
in support of the existing Jubaland 
administration.21 A confrontation between 
some Marehan militia supported by the SFG 
and al-Shabaab, on the one hand, and Ahmed 
Madobe’s forces in Kismayo on the other 
concluded with a victory for the new Madobe 
administration. The SFG then led by Hassan 
Sheikh, a Hawiye, promptly wrote a letter to the 
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AU accusing the Kenyan government of taking 
sides and supporting Madobe, requesting 
AMISOM’s Kismayo forces, composed of 
Kenyan troops, be replaced by another 
peacekeeping contingent. 
 
The Jubaland administration and the SFG 
finally came to an agreement in August 2013 
but great patience and considerable pressure 
from Ethiopia were needed to reach a 
conclusion to the talks in Addis Ababa. The 
two parties were engaged in a tedious 
discussion on the issue of management of the 
seaport and airport, fighting over control of the 
infrastructure. This was the most contentious 
matter. The effort to reconcile the two was 
difficult as they had very different objectives. 
The SFG wanted to control the resources 
available in Kismayo, including the lucrative 
charcoal business, though trying to portray the 
matter as a sovereignty issue, apparently 
believing the real forces controlling the 
infrastructure there were the Kenyans. At times 
the SFG appeared to think it was negotiating 
with the Kenyan government rather than the 
Jubaland administration. A strong belief 
remained in Mogadishu that the Kismayo 
administration is under the control of the 
Kenyan government during Hassan Sheikh’s 
leadership. Economic interests from within and 
without also complicated this. And it might be 
recalled that the Troop Contributing Countries 
meeting in Kampala on August 4, 2013 had 
(wrongly) decided that all ports and seaports 
should be handed over to the SFG. Kenya s 
opposed the implementation of this decision, 
but the SFG still appears determined to get this 
control. In fact, it is no more than a pipe dream. 
Terrorist attacks in Kenya enabled the Kenyan 
government to be a bit assertive and enjoy 
 
22 Another reason for the SFG’s determination was that it 
wanted to use a Kismayo precedent to set the tone for other 
administrations in the country. It believes, probably correctly, 
that if it conceded on Kismayo, others would raise management 
and resource sharing elsewhere, even perhaps in Mogadishu. 
having the upper hand in influencing Madobe 
and his compatriots around Kismayo. Kenya 
continues to work on strengthening its buffer 
zone. But the Kismayo administration cannot 
hand over the port to the SFG as it would mean 
loss of revenue and power eventually.22  
 
Ultimately, the two parties agreed to allow the 
Jubaland administration to control the port for 
six months. They also agreed to hold a new 
reconciliation conference in Mogadishu, to be 
organized by the SFG, which led to finalization 
of the agreement, which they finally signed. 
But, the two parties signed the agreement for 
very different reasons. The SFG wanted the EU 
Conference in Brussels, to agree to the New 
Deal Compact for Somalia to provide EU 
backing (and funding); the Jubaland 
administration of Sheikh Madobe wanted 
international recognition.23 Both got what they 
wanted so there was no incentive to move 
forward with implementation of the remaining 
parts of the agreement, including 
reconciliation. This reluctance was reinforced 
by the fact that the two parties were under 
extreme pressure and accepted the final deal 
because they were unable to resist Ethiopia.24 
In any case the SFG itself almost immediately 
began to undermine the agreement, trying to 
manipulate the discontents of the Digil and 
Merifle in Baidoa.  
 
Indeed, the importance of the then Jubaland 
Agreement should not be exaggerated. 
Jubaland leaders have joined opposing 
Mogadishu, and the SFG’s request that the 
international community pressure the 
leadership in Kismayo to come to Mogadishu 
did not work. The issue of Jubaland is sensitive 
and it could have the effect of further 
23 Interview with Col. Gebregziabher (a long-time follower of 
Somalia issues in the Ministry of Defense of Ethiopia and in the 
IGAD Facilitation Office in Addis Ababa), June 2018. 
24 Ibid. 
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destabilizing Jubaland, as the question 
involves a complex clan and sub-clan struggle 
for control of resources and supremacy. 
Jubaland eventually hosted a larger opposition 
framework that brought all other 
administration to a common front called the 
Council of Interstate Cooperation.  
d) Galmudug  
 
The potential division of the Somalia state did 
not stop in the Juba valley, since the “splitting 
up” of southern Somalia into federal states 
included the establishment of a new local 
administration in Galmudug, a decentralized 
‘state’ in the central region. Adjacent to 
Galmudug, Ahlu Sunna wal Jama’a, a religious 
group created to oppose al-Shabaab’s 
extremism, manages an area that belongs to 
the Habir Gedir sub-clan and partly to the 
Marehan and Dir sub-clans.  
 
Ahlu Suna Wal Jama and the Galmudug state 
have reconciled their differences, but continue 
to suffer a pressure from Mogadishu. 
Galmudug welds powers that threaten leaders 
within the Federal Government since it also 
incorporates a previously separate 
administration, Himim iyo Heeb representing 
the Suleiman sub-clan in the same central 
area. Fierce competition between Ahlu Sunna 
and the SFG leadership has been witnessed as 
well, and this is still reflected in the SFG’s 
involvement in undermining the leadership in 
Galmudug.25 
 
Developments in Galmudug attract attention 
due to clan influence of the Habir Gedir in 
Mogadishu politics and economic 
developments, the role in al-Shabaab, and the 
Galkayo conflict since the state increases 
 
25 There was an effort to oust the Galmudug leadership, by 
creating differences and competition between the Speaker of 
changes the power relations between the 
Majertain and Habir Gedir in Galkayo. The 
clans residing in Galmudug stretch into 
Mogadishu and thus impact the dynamics in 
the capital city. Due to the power vacuum after 
Siad Barre’s overthrow (1991) and years of 
exploitation by warlords, the Habir Gedir clan 
significantly gained influence. Despite losses in 
military strength, they remain the most 
influential actors in Somalia disproportionately 
to their size and the areas they reside in (the 
central region). 
 
Moreover, the first area that Al-Shabaab 
experienced defeat at the hands of other 
Somali actors is in Galmudug, turning it into 
the only FMS with no significant Al-Shabaab 
presence (except in the Suleebaan area). 
Maintaining the FMS integrity and capacity is 
essential to shoring up this security win. On the 
other hand, Galmudug changes the divide and 
power relations between Hawiye and Darood 
communities that dominates Galkayo. The 
resulting harmful dynamics can be found in 
many other areas of Somalia. Thus, resolution 
of the conflict between Galmudug and the SFG 
could have a positive effect on other conflicts 
across Somalia between competing clans, 
pastoral communities, local authorities and 
state governments.26 
e) South West and Hir-Shebelle 
administrations 
 
The administrations of the South West and Hir-
Shebelle also exercise control over ‘their’ 
territories and contest the SFG’s monopoly of 
coercion, although they are considered less 
effective than other administrations. Even if 
there are weaknesses in these administrations, 
the fact that they are anchored in a certain 
the House and the President. The crisis still lingers in the 
administration. 
26 Interpeace: Galkayo Conflict Assessment, 2017 
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major clan and some minority clans that share 
particular powers sustains them. But these 
administrations also indicate how far Somalis 
are divided along clan and sub-clan lines from 
north to south. This inevitably gives rise to the 
suggestion that clans would provide a logical 
basis for a federal arrangement, and this 
framework is enshrined in the draft federal 
constitution although the current SFG 
leadership is resisting its implementation. On 
the other hand, there is growing concern 
among regional administration officials related 
to emerging changes in Ethiopia, in the 
Ethiopia-Eritrea relationship, and in Djibouti-
Eritrea relations and the subsequent move 
both countries have made to engage the SFG 
leadership. This has allowed the SFG to 
blatantly interfere and present its own 
candidate and forcing the incumbent Sharif 
Hassan to resign. An independent candidate 
also came to the scene in the name of Muktar 
Robow. A former Al-Shabaab senior leader, 
whose candidacy created concern among the 
international community, is now under custody 
after the SFG forces in collaboration with 
AMISOM forces captured him. The incident has 
increased the tension in Baidowa, as Robow 
comes from the biggest and influential clan 
called Leysan. Following the incident, the SFG 
candidate, Mr. Abdiaziz Hassan Mohamed—
nicknamed Laftagareen—got an overwhelming 
majority to be elected as the new President of 
the Southwest in a contested election. This will 
create another fault line in the relations 
between sub-clans in Baidoa since Laftagareen 
is from Hariin sub-clan. 
 
Stereotypical images of Somalis have often led 
observers to ignore key differences among 
them. As noted above, the administrative 
structures follow divergences within Somali 
communities that go deeper, following 
divisions on the ‘diya-paying’ level of Somali 
organization—the lowest level social 
organization in which liabilities or benefits are 
redistributed after a case is concluded through 
elders, which requires financial compensation 
to be paid to the victims or heirs of a crime 
such as murder, bodily harm or property 
damage. Despite their alleged homogeneity 
and their own frequent criticisms of the many 
internal divisions, the Somali Nationalist 
Movements have always demonstrated 
numerous splits and frequently broken into 
separate parties. One fundamental reason for 
this is the fluid nature of clanism, the informal 
rules they follow and the ability of the clan 
elites to politicize their own clan segments. 
Another reason lies in the pastoral and agro-
pastoral traditions of independence and 
resentment of uniformity, which pervade much 
of Somali society.  
f) Clan identity and associated rules 
undermine state institutions 
 
Despite divisions, it should be noted that the 
issue of clan identity and trust remains critical 
in creating peace or conflict in Somalia. The 
intention of a clan member’s plea for support is 
never questioned among Somalis. This is the 
conventional way clans operate, and it can be a 
source of war or a deterrent, as well as a 
framework for protection. Clans provide full 
protection for individuals; their informal 
institutions and their enforcement 
mechanisms are framed within the rational 
choices of individual interest through 
distributional effects. These realities are 
important to make sense of the difficulties of 
reconstituting a Somali state. Clan institutions 
override all other institutions. They are the 
basis of a rational choice framework, since 
individual interest is critically embedded both in 
terms of protection and distribution effects. A 
Westphalian state has difficulty in taking these 
factors into account, and one result is that the 
international community has consistently 
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failed to give serious thought to these 
imperative aspects of Somali life. But they 
must be borne in mind in any consideration of 
how to handle the Somali problem.  
 
In light of these characteristics of the Somali 
clan system, it is time, perhaps, to consider the 
opportunities that appeared in 2004 and in 
subsequent years, all of which Somalis and the 
international community squandered. These 
make it very clear that Somali stakeholders 
were, and are, divided and weak, making them 
vulnerable. This also provides the opportunity 
for clan elites to manipulate a ‘scavenging’ 
international community to their own 
advantage. In this context one should not 
overlook the historical baggage Ethiopia 
carries regarding Somalia. In more recent 
times, Ethiopia has repeatedly been portrayed 
as a power bent on weakening and dividing 
Somalis. Some Somali elites in the diaspora 
and internally continue to believe that 
Ethiopia’s alleged policy of dividing and 
weakening Somalia will continue without 
change. The Somali elites have tried to use 
these assumptions and the animosity between 
the two states in such a way as to cling to 
power. Several leaders have used and 
manipulated these beliefs whenever they felt it 
might be suitable or expedient, and the 
possibility of its recurrence should not be 
discounted, even if its impact today is much 
weaker than ever before and ordinary Somalis 
on the ground have a very different and far 
more positive view of Ethiopia and take its 
government very seriously. In fact, Ethiopia is 
generally either feared or respected by 
Somalis.  
 
 
 
27 Andre Le Sage (2005): Stateless justice in Somalia, Formal 
and informal rule of law, Center for Humanitarian Dialogue, 
Geneva, Switzerland.   
2) How do informal institutions undermine 
the SFG’s monopoly of violence both 
militarily and governance?  
 
The Somalia Federal State’s monopoly of 
coercion is affected through informal 
institutions that will have implication on the 
way the security apparatus operate and 
individual security actors behave. There is a 
need to delve into how the informal rules 
operate to understand its links with Somalia 
has both formal and informal institutions that 
vary in determining the behaviours of state and 
non-state actors, with mixed results. Somali 
clan institutions called Xeer (pronounced as 
hàir), according to Andre Le Sage (2006), is 
defined as a “set of rules and obligations 
developed between traditional elders to 
mediate peaceful relations between Somalia’s 
competitive clans and sub-clans”. Xeer could 
also be defined as unwritten but communally 
owned rules created, communicated and 
enforced through the clan system taking 
particular situations into consideration to 
resolve day to day disputes and shape the 
behaviour of clan members. Those rules bring 
shared responsibilities and security 
guarantees. Somalis have flexible and adoptive 
rules to accommodate new and previously 
unknown realities and that help clans address 
inter-clan disputes for centuries, that shaped 
institutions adopt, expand in scope and endure. 
These rules govern members of each clan, 
wherever they are. These rules manage 
everything from major clan, sub-clan and sub-
sub-clan conflicts to rules of marriage, rights 
and inheritance, compensation, grazing rights, 
rights of individuals and rules for managing 
forests other natural resources and important 
issues.27 
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Even if there are losers (especially women) 
within the community and winners in clan 
institutions, they endure as clan members and 
do not defect, as the rules are applicable 
equally to all using those rules. Even if they are 
hierarchical in gender equality and the way 
minorities are treated, Somalis use them 
wherever they are considering the losses as 
side-line issues. Weaker sub-clans often lose-
out in the process as enforcement is left for 
the clans to sort out. Weaker clans don’t have 
the capacity to force powerful ones to obey 
unless they have another clan (which is often 
the case) that supports them by 
accommodating them as theirs. Somalis have 
this saying, “be a mountain or ally with it”.  
The cycle of decision-making process in clan 
institutions is mapped on Figure 1.   
 
These loopholes are not peculiar to informal 
Somali institutions, as there are inherent 
ambiguities in rules, which raise enforcement 
problems. Those defaults are tolerable so long 
as the main pillars of other factors are not 
seriously affected. Clan rules have equilibrium. 
Xeer will continue to be a predominant justice 
system in Somalia for a foreseeable future 
even if the universality of Xeer is contested. As 
argued by Mahoney and Thehlen (2010) 
“variations in scope of discretion that rules 
allow are quite varied: the complexity of the 
rules, the kind of behaviour regulated by the 
rules, the extent of resources mobilized by the 
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rules and so on all matter.”28 This holds true for 
Somali traditional laws. In fact, most Somalis 
consider Xeer fair and legitimate, these rules 
are taken as acceptable identities, even if the 
extent of discretion that actors have at the 
interpretation and enforcement level varies. It 
is in this context that all Xeer is ‘localized’, 
emanating from specific bilateral agreements 
between specific sub-clans that traditionally 
live adjacent to one another, and application of 
its rules are flexible and vary depending on 
circumstances.29 Hence, the resilience and 
adoptability of these ‘informal’ institutions 
helped them continue to endure and set 
standards of behaviour before “formal Western 
style” institutions in Somalia. 
 
Somalia continues to be a place whose actors 
follow clan customary rules that are at times 
complementary and or contradictory with state 
institutions. Whenever the state is strong, there 
appears complementarity between formal 
rules and informal institutions. In Somaliland 
there is complementarity and a consensus 
among the communities and the state on how 
the security actors behave in handling forces 
or groups that challenge the monopoly of 
coercion of the state. Soldiers are free from 
clan based diya-paying system in case of 
killings. This has helped the state to address 
challenges coming from groups like al-
Shabaab. These rules very much impact the 
operation of the security arena elsewhere. 
They are therefore important to be studied and 
identified so that one can interpret reactions on 
that basis. Those formal and informal rules are 
interpreted to fit perceptions or realities, 
triggering reactions for peace or war, 
cohabitation or continuous tensions. Three 
 
28 Mahoney and Thehlen (2010): Explaining Institutional change; 
Ambiguity Agency and Power, Cambridge University Press.   
29 Andre Le Sage (2005): Stateless justice in Somalia, Formal and 
informal rule of law, Center for Humanitarian Dialogue, Geneva, 
Switzerland   
legal systems operate side by side in Somalia: 
clan customary law, Islamic Sharia law and 
secular law. In 1960 the government’s effort to 
come up with a unified law in the 1960s did not 
succeed but clan customary laws continue to 
have a critical role in Somalia even after the 
collapse of the central state. The questions 
therefore are: what helps informal institutions 
endure and how do they affect the security 
arena? What are their mechanisms for change? 
How flexible are they to fit into existing 
conditions? How do they interact with formal 
and other rules? How do these rules impact 
behaviours of the Federal Government of 
Somalia, the Federal Member States and 
militant groups such as Al-Shabaab and the 
Islamic State of Somalia—ISS? 
 
In Somalia, since clan institutions are flexible, 
adoptive and have embedded self-reinforcing 
mechanisms linked to clear distributional 
outcomes to a substantive part of a group with 
the least transaction cost, they are very 
resilient. They are capable of resisting 
continuous exogenous shocks even if they are 
limited in scope and have weaknesses or 
loopholes in accommodating cross gender 
issues. Providing an individual level protection 
on the one hand and collective enforcement as 
well as punishment mechanism with 
distributional effect referring back to the 
individual utility on the other explain the 
sustainability of the informal institutions that 
endure. Resources mobilized locally or from 
the outside are used to reinforce those 
instruments. Moreover, the affinities and 
procedures on which international models of 
security governance are not only assumed are 
universal30, but they are pushed through 
without considering how existing local levels 
30 Alice Hills (2014) Security Sector or Security Arena? The 
Evidence from Somalia, International Peacekeeping, 21:2, 165-
180, DOI: 10.1080/13533312.2014.910400 
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informal institutions govern behaviours of 
actors at all levels and affect the 
implementation of those universal values. 
Furthermore, those universal values do not 
have mechanisms of accommodation 
neighbourhood realities and policies that 
further impact the behaviours of those local 
actors as power relations affect them. This 
leads all efforts at reforming security sectors 
that a single entity claims to control which in 
reality is farce. Somalia’s existing realities 
could explain this concretely. 
 
There are a number of salient characteristics 
of Somali customary laws. Somali customary 
rules concentrate on compensation than 
punishment. They have distributional effects. 
Timing and sequencing are also important in 
Somali clan institutions. Michael van Notten 
(2006) provides details, which can be 
summarized as follows: Somali clan 
institutions are relatively immune to political 
manipulation as most are known to clans and 
nobody controls them from the center; 
whoever comes up with the best rules gets the 
best customers; every Somali is free to use 
them; no one has the right to exclude anyone; 
the law prevents political controls (Notten 
2006). This is because the enforcement 
mechanism of the informal institutions and 
implementation of subsequent clan elders’ 
decisions is left to clans, and hence nobody will 
enforce if it is a political rule. However this 
does not mean that those clan elders are not 
influenced by exogenous factors. But since 
there is transparency in the society, where 
cases are addressed publicly there is nothing 
hidden, and to excel in that public discourse 
brings more legitimacy and respect that 
transcend the individual elder himself and 
reflects on the pride of the clan. Since elders 
represent clans, they remain consistent in 
keeping clan pride. This is critical to stay 
legitimate and get full support. Since most of 
the time it is inherited ancestrally, there is a lot 
at stake to maintaining that legacy and 
legitimacy.  
 
The existence of transparency further 
legitimizes clan elders’ decisions creating 
endogenous self-enforcing and self-reinforcing 
as well as feedback mechanisms. The self-
enforcing and re-enforcing mechanisms have 
distributional effects whose built-in transaction 
costs are considered negligible since those 
functioning do it on an ad-hoc basis, and don’t 
do the job for a living. A court is immediately 
established following a dispute. The 
transaction costs are minimal as the jury will 
sit under a tree in a natural environment, if 
there is any payment it is built into the 
compensation mechanism as part of the 
distributional effect. This is similar to efficiency 
considerations that stress minimizing 
transaction costs in firms (Knight 1992). 
Knight notes “the idea that institutions are 
created according to the principle of cost 
minimization is grounded in the notion of 
individual efficiency” (Ibid). This becomes 
critical in the case of Somalia when the role of 
a government comes into play. What is 
efficient for the government might be 
inefficient for the society as formal rules have 
distributional consequences. The government 
has to mobilize resources and its organization 
to deal with the matter. The clans in this regard 
respond expeditiously maximizing of utility at 
clan and individual level.  
 
In addition, Somali Xeer—the traditional legal 
system of Somalis wherever they are—has a 
built-in procedure for its own development. The 
traditional judges have an obligation to apply 
only the rules that the people of their 
community follow in practice, and to promptly 
render justice at diya-paying level organization. 
If not, an aggrieved group’s revenge is justified. 
When new things emerge as a challenge with 
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no precedents, clan elders come together and 
create rules that accommodate new cases. 
This also provides an endogenous mechanism 
for institutional change and enforcement. The 
informal clan institutions have also 
accommodated the arrival of Islam, although 
not always entirely effectively, failing to 
assimilate all aspects of it. Reflecting these, 
the oaths of those who testify have changed 
overtime. Puntland Development Research 
Centre explains that in the 19th and early 20th 
century those who testified in front of a jury 
took an oath saying, “I solemnly swear on my 
sons, my livestock, my testicles, on my 
existence and on my values.” After the arrival 
of Islam this changed to: Wallahi Billahi Tollahi, 
which means that he swears in the name of 
Allah and my clan. The plaintiff also might ask 
oath-takers to swear as follows: “Let my semen 
come before my urine” or “I will divorce my wife 
if I don’t tell the truth” (PDRC 2004). The 
evolution of this oath, taken in front of the 
community, demonstrates the flexibility and 
adaptability of clan institutions. 
 
So why are these informal institutions and their 
modus operandi important in explaining the 
challenges of Somalia’s government and its 
security institutions? Since these rules 
determine the behaviour of clan members, 
support or opposition to state structures and 
their institutions can contradict clan rules and 
reinforcement mechanisms. This in turn 
determines the behaviour of SFG’s officials and 
soldiers in their military engagements with 
groups that are challenging the state’s 
monopoly of force. It also creates a structure 
where the SFG officials and their actors 
interact with others in different groups, 
including al-Shabaab to share information as 
members of the same clan—an obligation that 
 
31 Interview with senior Sahaan official in Hargeisa, September 
2018. 
one has to engage as families governed 
through the informal institutions.  
 
In fact, al-Shabaab manipulates clan structures 
and clan rules. It uses fault lines in the relations 
between these clan structures for its survival. 
Al-Shabaab insurgents are equally protected 
through clan rules. But al-Shabaab fighters 
escape to account for their crimes, including in 
killing Somali security force members, because 
they cover their face and are unknown 
individually to obey deterrence rules. But, when 
they are killed in combat, the person involved in 
killing as part of the SFG military will be 
accounted for and clans might consider 
compensation or a possibility of revenge from 
the families of the deceased might be triggered 
as indicated in fig.1. This can only be 
addressed if various clan leaders come 
together and clear that government soldiers 
and staffs of the security institutions would not 
be treated in those clan institutions. 
Somaliland has successfully done this.31 
Considering all these the possibility for the SFG 
to achieve a monopoly of coercion that one 
could think of reforming a security sector is 
very remote. The FMs on the other hand are 
rather better situated in creating a 
complementarity between the formal 
institutions and the informal clan-based 
institutions, since a strong clan or an alliance 
of various clans establish them and govern 
their areas through consent. 
3) Sub-contracted coercive powers of non-
Somali actors 
3.1) Sub-contracted coercion exercised 
through AMISOM  
 
Different actors in Somalia view AMISOM’s role 
differently. Some see it as a proxy for 
neighbourhood policies of Somalia’s 
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neighbours. Some Somali actors see AMISOM 
as infidels and occupiers. Some others see 
AMISOM as defenders of Somalia’s fragile 
institutions as per the UNSC mandate. 
Whatever others say about AMISOM there is a 
need to look at AMISOM’s creation and how its 
role might determine the fate of the SFG. As 
indicated earlier, the African Union Mission in 
Somalia (AMISOM)32 subsumed the idea of the 
Intergovernmental Authority on Development 
(IGAD) Peace Support Mission to Somalia or 
IGASOM. When IGASOM was proposed by 
IGAD through a communiqué it adopted in 
March 2005, there was no support for it.  
 
Ethiopia’s campaign to oust the Islamic Courts 
Union in December 2006 eventually forced the 
United Nations Security Council to authorize 
the African Union to deploy a peace support 
mission with a mandate of six months, 
adopting resolution 1744 (2007) on 20th 
February 2007.33 With a mandate created by 
the African Union and endorsed by the UNSC, 
the African Union Mission’s aim was to assist 
the TFG and protect its fledgling institutions. 
Ethiopia had decided to withdraw, although a 
reconciliation meeting held in Djibouti between 
the TFG and the Alliance for the Restoration of 
Somalia (ARS) requested Ethiopia to withdraw 
its forces, the Ethiopian government had 
decided way before to withdraw its forces from 
Somalia. But to ensure a smooth transition and 
help the new administration that was created 
in Djibouti, Ethiopian army wanted the new 
government mobilise its forces and take over 
areas that it withdraws. 
 
But it responded to Uganda threat to withdraw 
if Ethiopian forces left. At this stage, AMISOM 
was simply not strong enough. Ethiopia then 
publicly reassured Uganda that it would act 
 
32 Ethiopian forces provided a major protection for AMISOM until 
its deployment is fully organized. Ethiopia also publicly promised 
the Ugandan and Burundian governments that Ethiopian forces 
expeditiously if AMISOM forces were 
threatened. This sent an effective message to 
Somali actors. Although UN experts travelled 
to Somalia to assess the situation on the 
ground the UN agreed neither to deploy a UN 
peacekeeping force nor to re-hat AMISOM to 
be deployed as a UN peacekeeping force, 
effectively limiting its ability to control the 
situation without additional support. 
 
There are a number of reasons for the UN 
decision, including the attitude of the UN 
bureaucracy. In order to deploy a peacekeeping 
force in a certain country, there are a number 
of preconditions that need to be fulfilled. A UN 
peacekeeping force can be deployed if the 
parties to the conflict sign a peace agreement 
and hence there is a “peace to keep”. But in 
Somalia the fighting has consistently been 
between a weak government and an Al-Qaeda 
affiliated terrorist group. Neither the Somali 
Federal Government, nor the international 
community at large will expect the SFG to 
negotiate with a terrorist organization. Hence, 
there is no possibility of having a peace 
agreement, the precondition to deploy a UN 
peacekeeping force.  
 
However, there is an African Peacekeeping 
Force. AMISOM’s deployment at the beginning 
was with a lighter mandate and that mandate 
was eventually revised by the UN Security 
Council on March 6, 2013 and extended until 
February 2014. The mandate, according to UN 
Resolution 2093 (2013), includes, inter alia:  
 
(a) To maintain a presence in the four sectors set 
out in the AMISOM Strategic Concept of 5 
January 2012, and in those sectors, in 
coordination with the Security Forces of the 
Federal Government of Somalia, reduce the 
will return to Somalia and will do whatever is necessary to protect 
AMISOM from any danger. 
33 www.un.org/depts/dhl/resguide/scact2006.htm 
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threat posed by Al-Shabaab and other armed 
opposition groups, including receiving, on a 
transitory basis, defectors, as appropriate, and in 
coordination with the United Nations, in order to 
establish conditions for effective and legitimate 
governance across Somalia; (b) To support 
dialogue and reconciliation in Somalia by 
assisting with the free movement, safe passage 
and protection of all those involved with the 
peace and reconciliation process in Somalia; (c) 
To provide, as appropriate, protection to the 
Federal Government of Somalia to help them 
carry out their functions of government, and 
security for key infrastructure; (d) To assist, 
within its capabilities, and in coordination with 
other parties, with implementation of the Somali 
national security plans, through training and 
mentoring of the Security Forces of the Federal 
Government of Somalia, including through joint 
operations; (e) To contribute, as may be 
requested and within capabilities, to the creation 
of the necessary security conditions for the 
provision of humanitarian assistance; (f)  To 
assist, within its existing civilian capability, the 
Federal Government of Somalia, in collaboration 
with the United Nations, to extend state authority 
in areas recovered from Al-Shabaab; (g) To 
protect its personnel, facilities, installations, 
equipment and mission, and to ensure the 
security and freedom of movement of its 
personnel, as well as of United Nations 
personnel carrying out functions mandated by 
the Security Council.34  
 
This remained the main mandate for 
AMISOM’s operations to-date. The resolution 
also indicated that the UNSC agrees “with the 
Secretary-General that the conditions in 
Somalia are not yet appropriate for the 
deployment of a United Nations Peacekeeping 
Operation, and requests that the UNSG keeps 
this under review, including through the setting 
of benchmarks for when it might be 
appropriate to deploy a United Nations 
 
34 The full UNSC resolution 2093 (2013) is available at 
http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2013/sc10931.doc.htm 
35 Ibid. 
peacekeeping operation and looks forward to 
receiving this information as part of his regular 
reporting to the Security Council”.35 Although 
the UN refused to re-hat AMISOM as a UN 
force, does provide logistical support. Even if 
there is “no peace to keep” AMISOM has 
therefore been given a role to challenge those 
extremist forces that are trying to fill 
ungoverned spaces in Somalia. If these non-
state actors such as al-Shabaab are left to 
develop, they will have the space to train 
terrorists and suicide bombers and transfer 
their knowledge to wreak havoc in the region 
and beyond.  
 
Obviously, a UN peacekeeping force cannot do 
a combat operation. The UN tried a peace 
enforcement mission in Somalia in the early 
1990s and failed. As Barnett (2002) explains 
there are what are called norms within the UN 
bureaucracy, whereby “peacekeepers should 
follow the principles of neutrality, impartiality 
and consent.”36 Obviously AMISOM or even a 
UN peacekeeping force would find it difficult if 
not impossible to follow those norms in 
Somalia as the theatre of the engagement is 
completely different from those for which the 
norms were designed. Any peacekeeping force 
that wants to be neutral, impartial or to be 
deployed by consent will not find the 
environment in Somalia. There is no possibility 
to follow those norms in Somalia. The UN 
bureaucracy did not even agree to re-hat 
AMISOM into a UN peacekeeping force 
because of those same norms. But what is 
worse is the fact that the UN has yet to agree 
how AMISOM should be resourced for its 
operations beyond voluntary contributions 
making its sustainability a challenge. 
 
One might argue that the resolution (2093) as 
indicative of the UN’s possible intention of 
36 Michael Barnett (2002): Eye witness to a genocide, the United 
Nations and Rwanda, Cornell University Press. 
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allowing continental organizations to handle 
“their” problems through subsidiarity and take 
this as the beginning of that trend. Resolution 
2093 (2013) called “upon new and existing 
donors to support AMISOM through the 
provision of additional funding for troop 
stipends, equipment, technical assistance, and 
un-caveated funding for AMISOM to the United 
Nations Trust Fund for AMISOM, and calls 
upon the AU to consider providing funding to 
AMISOM through its own assessed costs as it 
has recently done for the African-led 
International Support Mission in Mali”.37  
 
AMISOM’s resource contributions remained to 
be outside the usual assessed contributions 
mechanism of funding and this continues to 
challenge the effectiveness of AMISOM. Most 
Security Council members remain hesitant to 
support AMISOM or its re-hatting since it would 
trigger an assessed contribution, which would 
certainly increase expenditure.  
3.2 The role of Ethiopia and Kenya as Somalia’s 
neighbors 
 
Somalia shares boundaries with Kenya, 
Ethiopia and Djibouti. Historically there were 
claims and counter claims between Somalia 
and its neighbours on Somali speaking 
territories of the Horn. Although the African 
Union through its predecessor the Organization 
of African Unity had settled the question of 
borders through the Cairo declaration of 1964, 
Somalia had rejected the declaration at that 
time. Since Somalia’s civil war had weakened 
the government in Mogadishu and allowed the 
establishment of FMs the capacity of the 
centre not to allow other non-state actors that 
undermine the security of Somalia’s 
neighbours is nil. Because of this Somalia’s 
neighbours are actively involved in Somalia 
politically and militarily. This involvement is 
 
37 The full UNSC resolution 2093 (2013) is available at 
http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2013/sc10931.doc.htm 
direct unilateral combat and working with in 
the AMISOM framework and or through other 
proxies in Somalia.  
 
a) Kenya 
 
Kenya, following a number of Al-Shabaab 
harassments, decided to take measures to 
clean Al-Shabaab out of areas bordering its 
territories and sent hundreds of troops into 
southern Somalia. The governments of 
Somalia and Kenya signed a joint communiqué 
calling for “decisive action” against Al-
Shabaab.38 In fact, however, after his Prime 
Minister signed the document, Somalia’s then 
President, Sheik Sharif, criticized Kenya’s 
military offensive, which raised questions 
about how bilateral the military action had 
been.  A tri-partite meeting between the 
Presidents of Kenya, Uganda and Somalia 
convened in Nairobi to sort out the 
differences39. The other aspect that 
demonstrates the role of power politics is how 
Kenya, which sent its forces into Somalia to 
create a buffer zone along their joint border, 
was quickly embedded as part of AMISOM. 
 
The current government in Somalia continues 
to have a problem with Kenya as the politics of 
clan plays its own part in the differences 
among TFG leaders over Kenya’s role. Kenya 
said the purpose of the operation was to 
support Somalia in its battle against Al-
Shabaab and plans to stay in Somalia until the 
threat of the insurgents has been “reduced.” At 
the beginning, Kenya insisted the involvement 
of other neighbouring states (especially 
Ethiopia) even if Ethiopia had decided to stay 
out, the Ethiopian government openly 
expressed its desire not to be part of AMISOM 
but expressed its commitment to do everything 
possible to support TFG, AMISOM and Kenya 
38 www.topics.nytimes.com 
39 www.garoweonline.com 
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from outside.40 In spite of calls from friends 
and neighbours the Ethiopian government 
made a political decision to stay out of 
AMISOM.41 But Ethiopia supported the 
integration of Kenyan forces into AMISOM.42 
IGAD issued a communiqué at the end of the 
Summit in support of the Kenyan, TFG and 
AMISOM efforts to defeat Al-Shabaab once 
and for all.43  
 
 
One can elaborate on the Kenyan intervention 
in Somalia on the basis of the framework put 
forward by Richard Rosecrance. Rosecrance 
argues that a surprising fact of international 
history is how frequently countries act above 
or below their rational “power lines”. This is 
because leadership strategies and ideology 
and also the constraints of domestic politics 
enter the equation and may determine the 
result, and he explains how the US and the UK 
should have acted to stop Nazi Germany in the 
1930s.44 Similarly, Kenya should have reacted a 
long time ago to the activities of Al-Shabaab. 
Kenya should have understood that when 
Ethiopia went into Somalia in 2006 to remove 
the ICU, it was doing it for its national security 
interests and this would benefit Kenya in the 
process. Kenya did not feel this was the case 
at the time. Now, however, Kenya is requesting 
Ethiopia to join it in the fight inside Somalia. 
Ethiopia is prepared to do so, but within a 
different context and not through AMISOM 
mechanism. Kenya is doing this at a time that 
its operations have secured the support of its 
people and the international community. This 
can be analysed through Rosecrance’s Foreign 
Policy determinants, of a positive attitude from 
 
40 Notes from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ethiopia on the 
meeting of IGAD leaders November 25, 2011. 
41 Ibid. 
42 Ibid. 
43 IGAD communiqué November 25, 2011. 
44 Richard Rosecrance: The failure of static and the need for 
dynamic approaches to international relations, The Oxford 
Handbook of International Relations, 2010, pp.719. 
the international community, leadership 
commitment and domestic politics. Kenya has 
fully secured the support of its neighbours, the 
IGAD countries. France, the US and the UK fully 
support Kenya’s endeavours.45 The 
governments of South Africa, Rwanda and 
Tanzania have voiced support for Kenya’s 
operation, and both Kenya and Somalia have 
asked for “big countries,” including the United 
States and European nations, to help in a naval 
blockade of the highly coveted Shabaab-
controlled seaport of Kismayo.46  
 
Although there were some concerns within the 
TFG on Kenya’s actions, especially on the part 
of former President Sheikh Sharif, things 
appear to have been rapidly cleared. In terms 
of the domestic politics of Kenya, the coalition 
government had no choice other react militarily 
to Al-Shabaab’s harassment of Kenya. The 
Kenyan government will reinforce Kenya’s role 
as well. If one compares the situation Ethiopia 
found it in 2006, Kenya’s position is far more 
favourable. It has both a domestic and an 
international environment largely supportive for 
its actions.  
 
b) Ethiopia 
 
Ethiopia was told point-blank not to send its 
forces into Somalia.  Ethiopia did not get any 
financial or material support from anybody 
even though it stayed more than two years in 
Somalia, and the then TFG leadership had 
called for Ethiopia’s support. Due to the 
historical baggage between Ethiopia and 
Somalia the majority of the Somalis47 
45 IGAD countries issued a Joint Communiqué after their 
meeting in Addis Ababa and this is available at 
www.igadint.org/ 
46 www.topics.nytimes.com. 
47 For example, the former President of Somaliland, Ahmed 
Silanyo, who was an opposition figure in Somaliland expressed 
his reservations and told Ethiopian government officials his 
opposition on Ethiopia’s interventions and how Somalis 
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especially those in the Diaspora were not 
entirely supportive of Ethiopia’s incursion. The 
Ethiopian leadership was committed to 
addressing the challenges that the ICU posed 
on the Transitional Federal Government and to 
Ethiopia’s peace and security, and domestic 
politics was favourable (apart from one 
opposition political party expressing concern in 
the Parliamentary debate over the objectives of 
the incursion). The challenge was from the 
international community, though once the war 
was concluded successfully; African countries 
and some from the west were prepared to 
express appreciation. Surprisingly perhaps, 
most Arab countries were supportive and 
expressed this privately to an Ethiopian 
delegation that toured UAE, Oman, Bahrain and 
Yemen; but few were prepared to make their 
views public.48 The only thing they asked for 
was a quick withdrawal of the forces. The then 
Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak was the 
only who told Ethiopia to stay as long as was 
needed; although at a later stage the 
involvement of the Egyptian government with 
some Somali actors left a lot to be desired.49 
 
Overall, the international environment (from the 
western hemisphere) was hostile even though, 
as noted above, the US played a fairly positive 
role in the Security Council after Ethiopia had 
defeated the extremists. By contrast, IGAD 
endorsed Kenya’s move into Somalia and 
hence created a mechanism whereby Kenya 
can be assisted.  The African Union quickly 
endorsed IGAD’s decision. Although Kenya 
moved into Somalia to address its own 
security concerns and deployed its military 
forces unilaterally, the international community 
did not hesitate to allow Kenya to 
accommodate its forces under AMISOM and 
 
wherever they are feel about Ethiopia’s role. This did not make 
Addis Ababa happy. 
48 Although wikileaks reports indicate that some Arab officials 
expressed thanks to their US counterparts for a job well-done by 
the US in Somalia in 2006-2007, following the media’s portrayal 
of Ethiopia fighting the US’s war on terrorism. 
thus get paid for activities in support of its own 
security protection. It was a classic case of just 
how power relations work in international 
politics. The UK was at the forefront in 
supporting Kenya’s accommodation into 
AMISOM.  
 
Ethiopia’s policy in Somalia will have continuity 
and change at the same time due to its internal 
changes regarding its policies regarding the 
Oromo Liberation Front (OLF), the Ogaden 
National Liberation Front (ONLF) and Ginbot-7 
as well as the recent rapprochement with 
Eritrea. The Federal Member States in Somalia 
might lose in the short-term, since their 
security relevance to Ethiopia will be linked to 
Al-Shabaab only. Eritrea’s strong opposition 
regarding federalism in general might impact 
Ethiopia’s engagement with the FMs. Ethiopia’s 
position on Al-shabaab will remain the same 
and hence continuity might be reassured. If the 
SFG and Al-Shabaab sort their differences out, 
then the whole dynamics will change. But, the 
FMS are going to resist the move to impose 
the SFG. At the same time the new Ethiopian 
leadership has to learn a bit about Somalia as 
they have no historical linkages and Somalis 
will look at the issues in a transactional 
framework. Operational level changes are 
inevitable on the Ethiopian side as there are 
changes of operatives. Ethiopia and Eritrea are 
bringing the SFG into a new form of alliance, 
because the SFG has leverage as Somalia’s 
legitimate government to request that the UN 
and the AU lift the sanctions on Eritrea. The 
existing SFG leaders are also excited that they 
have been brought in to play a regional role, 
while they have only insignificant legitimacy 
locally. The Ethiopian government’s behavior 
49 Abdiqassim Salad Hassan the former TNG President was 
involved in coordinating activities from Cairo in support of 
those who opposed the TFG and Ethiopia’s presence; and it 
would be difficult to suggest that Egypt was not involved in this 
activity. There is documentary evidence available.   
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with regard to Somalia still depends on how 
and the extent to which Somalia involves itself 
in the affairs of the Ethiopian Somali region 
and cooperates in dismantling al-Shabaab if a 
peaceful resolution to the conflict cannot be 
achieved. 
4) Conclusion and the way forward 
 
Somalia continues to be its own prisoner. The 
elite competition and the winner takes all 
mentality in the political leadership have made 
elite bargain a difficult endeavor. The existence 
and activities of various local and external 
actors as well as informal institutions impacts 
the functioning of Somalia’s security 
architecture. Since competing actors and 
institutions affect individual and group 
behaviours, these in turn challenge the SFG’s 
monopoly of coercion one cannot talk about 
the security sector and its reform in Somalia. 
The clan rules are the most resilient ones in 
Somalia, which are reinforced at local level 
governance frameworks that have become the 
basis for the FMs creation and sustainability. 
The fault lines that one sees between clans 
and sub-clans as well as FMs and the SFG will 
remain so long as clan contestations and 
violent competitions remain. All those 
individual actors that were associated with al-
Itihad al-Islamia, al-Citisam or al-Shabaab 
eventually use fault lines in the relations 
between clans and center-periphery relations 
and existing administrations for their survival. 
When actors within extremist groups are 
purged, they will eventually go back to their 
respective clans. Looking at Hassan Dahir 
Aweys, Muktar Robow, Abdi Godane and 
others would join back their clans to seek 
protection and political offices. The Habir 
Gedir-Ayr protects Hassan Dahir, and his Digil 
and Merifle clan protect Muktar Robow, which 
recently challenged the SFG by trying to run for 
the President of the Southwest Administration. 
The SFG got the full cooperation of AMISOM 
forces to capture Robow. The situation 
remains tense as the SFG candidate for the 
President of Southwest declared the winner. 
This effort by Robow is an indication of how 
these actors also seek political offices through 
their respective clans. Robow was allowed by 
the SFG to run for the office because his clan 
threatened to take up arms against the 
government.  
 
The 4.5 formula that has been the basis for the 
SFG formation might not be a popular idea, but 
there is no alternative that will provide a fair 
representation for smaller and subjugated 
clans. No one will provide representation for 
the Midgan and Jereer if the 0.5 representation 
quota is allocated for them. Whether one likes 
or not clan politics and clan representation 
works in Somalia.   
 
Most activities of Somalia’s neighbours, 
Ethiopia and Kenya in particular, were reactive 
to threats emanating from Somalia. Kenya and 
Ethiopia were reactive until both engaged and 
established their respective buffer zones. Ones 
the buffer zones are put in place, they become 
proactive in governing the areas they manage 
directly or through proxies. Since there will be a 
proxy force or a direct force involved the areas 
under their control demands a continuous 
surveillance and a governance system that is 
managed properly so that issues that rivals or 
other contending groups would use and 
endanger the security of their personnel or the 
proxy groups involved. Those governing areas 
under their control would develop capacities 
that would demand additional benefits from 
the SFG or others.  
 
Ethiopia’s unilateral military action against the 
Union of Islamic Courts after failing to reach an 
agreement in several rounds of negotiations 
with the ICU and its military measures to 
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remove ICU eventually triggered AMISOM’s 
deployment. But Somalia’s frontline states are 
part of the peace support mission, and their 
national interests and threats they feel from 
non-state actors in Somalia impact the role 
they play. This demands that peace support 
missions take a serious look at the policies and 
interests of neighbours so that the role they 
play is positive and constructive in the wider 
regional context.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 26          The Security Sector Reform Paradox in Somalia 
 
References 
1. Abbink, Jon. “Briefing: The Eritrean-
Ethiopian Border Dispute.” African 
Affairs 97, no. 389 (October 1998): 551-
565.  
2. ———. “Ethiopia Eritrea: Proxy Wars and 
Prospects of Peace in the Horn of 
Africa,” Journal    of Contemporary 
African Studies 21, no. 3 (2003): 407-
425. 
3. Acemoglu, Daron and James A. 
Robinson. (2012): Why Nations Fail: 
The Origins of Power, Prosperity and 
Poverty. New York: Crown Publishing 
Group, 2012. 
4. Alice Hills (2014): Security Sector or 
Security Arena? The Evidence from 
Somalia, International Peacekeeping, 
21:2, 165-180, DOI: 
10.1080/13533312.2014.910400 
5. Andre Le Sage (2005): Stateless justice 
in Somalia, Formal and informal rule of 
law, Center for Humanitarian Dialogue, 
Geneva, Switzerland   
6. Bereketeab, Redie. The Horn of Africa; 
Intra-state and Inter-state Conflicts and 
Security. London: Pluto Press, 2013.  
7. Berhanu, Kassahun. “Conflicts in the 
Horn of Africa and Implications for 
Regional Security.” In The Horn of 
Africa, edited by Redie Bereketeab. 
London: Pluto Press, 2013.  
8. Burbidge, Dominic. “The Kenyan State’s 
Fear of Somali Identity.” African Centre 
for the Constructive Resolution of 
Disputes. 23 October 2015. 
9. Carson, Johnnie. “Kenya: The Struggle 
Against Terrorism.” In Battling 
Terrorism in the Horn of Africa, edited 
by Robert I. Rotberg. Washington: 
Brookings Institution Press, 2005.  
10. Castagno, Alphonse A. "The Somali-
Kenyan Controversy: Implications for 
the Future." The Journal of Modern 
African Studies 2, no. 2 (1964): 165-
188.  
11. Clapham, Christopher. Africa and the 
International System: The Politics of 
State Survival. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1996.  
12. ———. “Why Is the Horn Different?” Rift 
Valley Institute (2013).  
13. Cliffe, Lionel. "Regional Dimensions of 
Conflict in the Horn of Africa." Third 
World Quarterly 20, no. 1 (1999): 89-
111.  
14. Daniela Kroslak, “Somalia: Militant 
Islamists Try to Draw Kenya into a 
Trap,” International Crisis Group, June 
26, 2009, 
http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/inde
x.cfm?id=6185 
15. De Waal, Alex. Demilitarizing the Mind: 
African Agendas for Peace and 
Security. Trenton: Africa World Press, 
2002.  
16. ———. Islamism and its Enemies in the 
Horn of Africa. Bloomington: Indiana 
University Press, 2004. 
17. ———. The Real Politics of the Horn of 
Africa: Money, War and the Business of 
Power. Cambridge: Polity Press, 2015.  
18. ———.The Future of Ethiopia, 
Developmental State or Political 
Marketplace? World Peace Foundation, 
2018.  
19. Drysdale, John. The Somali Dispute. 
London: Pall Mall Press, 1964.  
20. Feyissa, Dereje and Hoehne, Markus 
Virgil Hoehne, eds. Borders and 
Borderlands as Resources in the Horn 
of Africa. Woodbridge: Boydell and 
Brewer, 2010.  
21. Healy, Sally. “Peacemaking in the Midst 
of War: An Assessment of IGAD’s 
Contribution to Security.” Royal Institute 
of International Affairs, working paper 
no. 59 (2009).  
22. International Crisis Group. “The Kenyan 
Military Intervention in Somalia.” Africa 
Report no. 184, 15 February 2012.  
23. Jalata, Asafa, ed. State Crises, 
Globalization and National Movements 
in North-East Africa: The Horn’s 
Dilemma. Abingdon: Routledge, 2004. 
24. Laitin, David and Said Samatar. 
Somalia: Nation in Search of a State. 
London: Dartmouth Publishing Co., 
1987. 
 27          The Security Sector Reform Paradox in Somalia 
 
25. Lata, Leenco. “The Ethiopian-Eritrea 
War.” Review of African Political 
Economy 30, no. 97 (2003): 369-388.  
26. Lewis I. M. Understanding Somaliland 
and Somalia. London: Hurst, 2008. 
27. ———. The Modern History of the 
Somali: Nation and State in the Horn of 
Africa. Athens: Ohio University Press, 
2002. 
28. ———. Blood and Bone: The Call of 
Kinship in Somali Society. Trenton: Red 
Sea Press, 1994. 
29. Lindemann, Stephan. “Inclusive Elite 
Bargains and the Dilemma of 
Unproductive Peace: A Zambian Case 
Study.” Third World Quarterly 32, no. 10 
(2011): 1843-1869. 
30. Lochery, Emma. “Rendering Difference 
Visible: The Kenyan State and Its 
Somali Citizens.” African Affairs 111, 
no. 445 (2012): 615-636. 
31. Lyons, Terrence. “Avoiding Conflicts in 
the Horn of Africa.” Council on Foreign 
Relations. New York: The Center for 
Preventive Action (2006). 
32. ———. “The Ethiopia–Eritrea Conflict 
and the Search for Peace in the Horn of 
Africa.” Review of African Political 
Economy 36, no. 120 (2009): 167-180. 
33. Mahoney and Thehlen (2010): 
Explaining Institutional change; 
Ambiguity Agency and Power, 
Cambridge University Press.   
34. Marchal, Roland. “Warlordism and 
Terrorism: How to Obscure an Already 
Confusing Crisis? The Case of 
Somalia.” International Affairs 83, no. 6 
(2007): 1091-1106. 
35. Maruf and Joseph (2018): Inside Al-
Shabaab, The Secret History of Al-
Qaeda’s Most Powerful Ally, Indiana 
University Press. 
36. Matt Bryden & Jeremy Brickhill (2010) 
Disarming Somalia: lessons in 
stabilization from a collapsed state, 
Conflict, Security & Development, 10:2, 
239-262, 
DOI:10.1080/14678801003665992 
37. Mengisteab, Kidane and Redie 
Bereketeab. Regional Integration, 
Identity and Citizenship in the Greater 
Horn of Africa. Woodbridge: Boydell 
and Brewer, 2012. 
38. Menkhaus, Ken. “Governance Without 
Government in Somalia: Spoilers, State 
Building and the Politics of Coping.” 
International Security 31, no. 3 (2007): 
74-106. 
39. ———. “After the Kenyan Intervention in 
Somalia.” Enough Project (2012), 
available at 
www.enoughproject.org/files/Menkahu
sKenyan interventionSomalia.pdf. 
40. Mesfin and Beyene: “The Practicalities 
of Living with Failed States”, Daedalus, 
146, 4 (Winter 2018), 128-140. 
41. North, Douglas. Institutions, 
Institutional Change and Economic 
Performance. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1990. 
42. Paul Jackson in Schnabel and Farr 
(eds.) 2012: Back to the Roots: Security 
Sector Reform and Development, 
Geneva Center for Democratic Control 
of Armed Forces. 
43. Plaut, Martin and Patrick Gilkes. 
"Conflict in the Horn: Why Eritrea and 
Ethiopia Are at War." Briefing paper: 
Royal Institute of International 
Affairs (1999). 
44. Prunier, Gérard. “Rebel Movements and 
Proxy Warfare: Uganda, Sudan and the 
Congo (1986–99).” African Affairs 103, 
no. 412 (2004): 359–383. 
45. Reid, Richard. “Old Problems in New 
Conflicts: Some Observations on Eritrea 
and Its Relations with Tigray, from 
Liberation Struggle to Inter-State War.” 
Journal of the International African 
Institute 73, no. 3 (2003): 369-401. 
46. Reno, William. Warlord Politics and 
African States. Boulder: Lynne Rienner 
Publishers, 1998. 
47. ———. “Somalia and Survival in the 
Shadow of the Global Economy.” QEH 
Working Paper Series no. 100 (2003). 
 28          The Security Sector Reform Paradox in Somalia 
 
48. ———. Warfare in Independent Africa. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2011. 
49. Richard Rosecrance (2010): The failure 
of static and the need for dynamic 
approaches to international relations, 
The Oxford Handbook of International 
Relations.  
50. Rondos, Alex. “The Horn of Africa—Its 
Strategic Importance for Europe, the 
Gulf States, and Beyond,” Horizons 6 
(2016). 
51. Rosecrance, Richard. “The Failure of 
Static and the Need for Dynamic 
Approaches to International Relations.” 
In The Oxford Handbook of 
International Relations, edited by 
Christian Reus-Smit and Duncan Snidal. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008. 
52. Rotberg, Robert I. State Failure and 
State Weakness in a Time of Terror. 
Washington: Brookings Institution 
Press, 2004. 
53. Sahnoun, Mohamed. Somalia: The 
Missed Opportunities. United States 
Institute of Peace Press, 1994. 
54. Samatar, Abdi Ismail. “The Production 
of Somali Conflict and the Role of 
Internal and External Actors.” In The 
Horn of Africa, edited by Redie 
Bereketeab. London: Pluto Press, 2013. 
55. Stephanie Hanson, “Al-Shabaab,” 
Council on Foreign Relations, February 
27, 2009, 
http://www.cfr.org/publication/18650/
alshabaab.html. 
56. Ursula C. Schroeder & Fairlie Chappuis 
(2014) New Perspectives on Security 
Sector Reform: The Role of Local 
Agency and Domestic Politics, 
International Peacekeeping, 21:2,133-
148, DOI: 
10.1080/13533312.2014.910401.
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Find out more about the  
Conflict Research Programme 
 
Connaught House 
The London School of Economics  
and Political Science 
Houghton Street 
London WC2A 2AE 
 
Contact: 
Anna Mkhitaryan, Programme Manager 
Tel: +44 (0)20 7849 4631 
Email: Intdev.Crp@lse.ac.uk 
 
lse.ac.uk/conflict 
The London School of Economics and 
Political Science is a School of the University 
of London. It is a charity and is incorporated 
in England as a company limited by guarantee 
under the Companies Acts (Reg no 70527). 
 
The School seeks to ensure that people are 
treated equitably, regardless of age, disability, 
race, nationality, ethnic or national origin, 
gender, religion, sexual orientation or personal 
circumstances. 
 
Photography: African Union Mission in 
Somalia (AMISOM) Force Commander, 
Lieutenant Gen. Tigabu Yilma, is received by 
senior commanders of the Ethiopian 
contingent serving under the AMISOM, upon 
arrival at Baidoa in the South West State of 
Somalia on 05 October 2019. AMISOM Photo. 
 
Disclaimer: Please note that the information 
provided is accurate at the time of writing but 
is subject to change. 
 
© Abdeta Dribssa Beyene, Conflict Research 
Programme 2020. 
